In these remarks, I try to emphasize the positive and concentrate on what I take to be Donald Davidson's more important contributions to the philosophy of language.
1 Finitude, Structure, and Truth
Finitude
The most basic theme in Davidson's writings in philosophy of language in the 1960s is that we are finite beings whose mastery of the indefinitely many expressions of our language must somehow arise out of our mastery of finite resources. Otherwise, there would be an unbounded number of distinct things to learn in learning a language, which would make language learning philosopher has its ordinary sense in Socrates was a philosopher, an oblique sense in Mary thinks that Socrates was a philosopher, a doubly oblique sense in Jack says that Mary thinks that Socrates was a philosopher, etc. If an oblique sense of an expression is not determined by the regular sense of the expression, and similarly for the doubly oblique and higher order senses, then this view appears to be committed to indefinitely many primitive senses, which violates Davidson's finite primitives constraint.
These and other similar early arguments of Davidson had a major impact at the time and it is now widely agreed that any acceptable analysis in these areas must respect some version or other of the finite primitives constraint.
Semantic Structure and Theory of Truth
Given that there is no bound to the number of expressions in a language, the finite primitives constraint implies that most expressions in the language are not primitive. Non-primitive expressions are themselves composed of primitive expressions and it seems that their meanings must somehow be determined by the expressions out of which they are composed, the meanings of those expressions, and the way they are put together. 3
But how can we explain the way that meanings of complex expressions are composed from the expressions they contain and the meanings of those expressions? Frege had proposed identifying meanings with entities of a certain sort, Fregean senses. The entity assigned as a sense to a compound expression was supposed to be a function of the entities assigned as senses to the expressions of which the compound expression was composed. However, Davidson argued that the Fregean approach had serious problems unless pursued in a certain way.
Davidson's positive proposal was that an explanation of how the mean-ings of complex expressions in a language depend on the meanings of their parts could be achieved though a theory of truth for the whole language or at least for a fragment containing the relevant expressions. The theory was to be modeled on Tarski's theory of truth for a certain formal language L. It was to satisfy a version of Tarski's Convention T, allowing proofs of relevant T sentences of the form, x is true in L iff p, where x was to be replaced by something that referred to a sentence of the language and p was to be replaced by that sentence or a translation of that sentence.
Not just any sort of theory of truth would do, however. For example, consider a fragment of a language with no indexical elements and no ambiguous expressions. Consider the theory of truth for that fragment with infinitely many axioms of the form: "S" is true iff S. Such a theory would not by itself shed light on how the meanings of complex expressions depend on the expressions from which they are composed and the meanings of those expressions.
So there were two related projects. One was to formulate other conditions on a theory of truth, in addition to Convention T, to be met if the theory was to serve as a key part of an explanation of semantic competence.
The other was to provide theories of truth of the relevant sort for various fragments of natural language.
With respect to the first project, that of finding additional constraints on the relevant sort of theory of truth, one suggestion was that the theory of truth have only finitely many (nonlogical) axioms. Such a constraint is related to the finite primitives constraint along with the idea that each axiom of the theory should correspond to a distinct aspect of a finite language user's competence, a distinct element that has to be learned in learning the language.
There were also constraints on the background logic. Substitutional quantification was disallowed and the logic was restricted to standard classical first order quantification theory with identity. Davidson's more considered view was that quoted material could be correctly treated both as something referred to and also as part of the containing sentence.
What can be said about the contemporary importance of Davidson's proposals about logical form? His treatment of adverbial modification in action sentences has been extremely influential. It has been widely adopted and extended. I think it is fair to say it is the standard view. On the other hand, the jury is still out concerning his proposal about quotation, although competing proposals appear to face serious problems.
What Aspects of Meaning Do Theories of Truth Help to Explain?
A theory of truth that was part of an account of linguistic competence for finite beings would have axioms for each primitive. There would be two kinds of axioms. For primitive predicates there might be axioms saying for example that the predicate "red" applies to something iff that thing is red. For connectives or quantifiers, there would be axioms that account for the way semantic properties of larger expressions depended on the semantic properties of their parts. So, for example, there might be an axiom saying that the connective "and" connects two sentences S and T in such a way that the result is true if and only if both S and T are true.
How could such a theory be used to explain or at least characterize the semantical properties of expressions in a given language? Well, it could be used to indicate what expressions are semantically primitive by having a separate axiom for each such predicate. The theory could also indicate how semantic properties of larger expressions depended on the semantic properties of their parts and they way they were constructed from their parts, by having a separate axiom for each such construction.
In addition, such a theory could help to specify what sort of expression a given expression is: a predicate, sentential connective, quantifier, etc.
Could the theory be used to explain or characterize the meaning you assign to a primitive predicate? I myself do not think such a theory could say any more than what is said in saying that "red" means red, "house" means house, and "brillig" means brillig.
Of course, I agree that the example with "brillig" is incorrect. If you do not already understand "brillig," you will not understand the claim that "brillig" means brillig. So, you could not have a theory with that claim in it.
But suppose the issue is how to explain our own linguistic competence from within, so to speak. Then the point is that such a theory cannot really say anything useful about our distinctive competence with particular primitive predicates, beyond reflecting the point that we use them as predicates!
On the other hand, it does seem plausible that theories of truth can and do reveal something significant about the meanings of sentential connectives and quantifiers. Why? Maybe because the meanings for us of these expressions depend on how we use those expressions and how our use depends on our recognition of certain patterns of implication and inconsistency involving the expressions, where implication and inconsistency are explainable in terms of truth conditions. For example, it seems to be an important aspect of the meaning of and that we take a conjunctive sentence using and to imply each of its conjuncts and to be implied by those conjuncts taken together.
3 Interpretation and Indeterminacy There is something odd in this idea, however natural it may be, in its suggestion that you "assign" or "attach" a meaning to expressions in your own language. It is sometimes said that you "grasp" certain meanings, as if your understanding consists in getting your mental hands around something. 7 One problem with these metaphors of assigning, attaching, and grasping is that people are not aware of assigning, attaching, or grasping meanings in the way that they are aware of grasping doorknobs, attaching post-it notes, and assigning tasks to employees. In any event, Davidson did not find these metaphors to be useful either in understanding the semantic structure of one's own language or for the interpretation of others.
To understand someone else is to interpret them-that is, to find a way to translate from their outlook into one's own. Interpretation is translation. For Davidson, at least sometimes, they were more than that and were supposed to capture the sort of semantic structure that was to be captured or expressed in theories of truth, so that the analytical hypotheses would include hypotheses about the semantic primitives and the nature of various constructions in the other language and how those things might be related to primitives and constructions in one's own language.
For Davidson, of course, the relevant sort of semantic structure was not a structure of meanings, intentions, and/or extensions. It was rather that aspect of syntactic or logical structure on which semantic interpretation depends.
Indeterminacy of Translation
Davidson like Quine believed in a certain sort of indeterminacy of translation. Both believed that there might be equally adequate and in fact correct ways to translate from another language L into one's own language according to which the translation of a certain sentence in the other language is S according to the first scheme of translation and T according to the second scheme of translation, where S and T are by no means synonymous and where it may even be that S is true iff T is not true.
One might take such indeterminacy to be incoherent because it would imply that the sentence in the other language is both true and false. But indeterminacy does not really have that implication, as I will try to explain.
It may help to use a distinction Quine made between immanent and transcendent predicates in the theory of language. 9 An immanent linguistic predicate is defined only for a particular language. A transcendent predicate is defined for all languages. The predicate word is presumably transcendent in this sense, whereas on the other hand Tarski's truth predicate is merely immanent because defined only for a particular language L.
We might define an immanent predicate means i by appeal to the schema:
where the same expression replaces both instances of "E". This only makes sense when "E" is an expression of our language, which is why this defines only an immanent notion.
And we might go on to attempt to define a transcendent predicate means t by appeal to the principle:
X in L means t E iff the translation of X in L into our language
This works to explain a transcendent notion of meaning that applies to expressions in any language, given the presupposition the expressions have unique translations into our language. Similarly, we might appeal to translation to define a transcendent truth predicate true t in terms of an immanent truth predicate true i :
X in L is true t iff the translation of X in L into our language is true i .
These ways of defining transcendent notions of meaning t and truth t presuppose determinacy of translation.
If there is indeterminacy of translation there will be indeterminacy of transcendent meaning t and perhaps even indeterminacy of transcendent truth t .
Suppose there is such indeterminacy of translation, because there are many equally good acceptable ways to map expressions in another language L into expressions in our language. Then we can define a relativized transcendent notion of meaning:
In relation to acceptable translation mapping m between L and our language, X in L means t (m) E iff m maps X in L into something in our language that means i E.
And we can define a relativized transcendent notion of truth:
In relation to acceptable translation mapping m between L and our language, X in L is true t (m) iff m maps X in L into something in our language that is true i . Now recall that Quine and Davidson both believed there might be equally adequate and in fact correct ways to translate from another language L into one's own language according to which the translation of a certain sentence in the other language is S according to the first scheme of translation and T according to the second scheme of translation, where S and T are by no means synonymous and where it may even be that S is true iff T is not true.
Recall the thought that such indeterminacy must be incoherent, because it would imply that the sentence in the other language is both true and false. We can now see that indeterminacy is not incoherent in that way.
Indeterminacy of translation merely implies that truth t is relative, that is, there is no absolute transcendent truth t , and there might be two acceptable translation mappings m and n such that a sentence in L is true t (m) but not true t (n).
Indeterminacy of Reference
Of course, the coherence of such indeterminacy does not establish that translation actually is indeterminate in that way. And whether translation is
indeterminate depends on what constraints there are on acceptable translation. The constraints Quine placed on translation-preservation of stimulus meaning and stimulus analyticity-were clearly not sufficient for determi-nate translation. And, although Davidson argued that there were different and additional constraints, he did not think these additional constraints were enough for determinate translation.
In particular, where Quine took occasion sentences to be prompted by stimulations of one's sense organs, Davidson took them to be prompted by one's perception of objects in the environment. One might think this means that for Davidson occasion sentences were to be interpreted as about the objects that prompt them, that is, as refering to those objects, but that assumption conflicts with an argument Davidson gave for indeterminacy of reference.
Davidson's argument went something like this. Suppose there were an interpretation of another person's language that identified primitive expressions and methods of semantic combination in a way that allowed the construction of a theory of truth for that language, a way that maximally satisfied constraints on interpretations. Suppose also that this interpretation involved assumptions about the reference of singular terms and the extensions of predicates in the language. Consider the set of entities that could be in the extension of a predicate or referred to by a singular term in that language and consider any one-one mapping of that set onto itself. Then define new notions of reference and extension, using this mapping, so that a term that originally referred to x now referred to M (x) and a predicate with an extension originally containing x now had an extension containing M (x).
Whatever sentences were true according to the original interpretation would be true according to the new one. Davidson took this to show that the new interpretation satisfied the same constraints as the original interpretation and concluded that there was indeterminacy of reference.
One might object that the new interpretation need not satisfy the same constraints, because it need not treat observation sentences as prompted by objects they are interpreted as referring to. Davidson would reply, I
suggest, that the relevant constraint on interpretation was that occasion sentences were prompted by things observed not that they referred to things observed. This is an important distinction apart from from considerations of indeterminacy of reference. When I point to a pump at the gas station and say, "Fill it up with that!" I am not saying to fill my gas tank up with the pump and when a scientist looking at streaks in a cloud chamber in the 50s said, "There goes a proton!" the scientist was not saying that the proton was a streak of cloud.
4 Alternative Conceptual Schemes.
In order to avoid reifying meanings and "the myth of the museum" of meanings in the head, Quine suggested replacing claims about meaning with claims about significance and synonymy. 10 We were to replace a claim that an expression has a meaning with a claim that the expression is significant and replace a claim that an expression means E with the claim that the expression is synonymous with "E". Quine believed there are distinct behavioral criteria for significance and synonymy. He thought we might have excellent reason to believe that people are using a language significantly while being unable to translate from that language into our own language, even when such translation is not even possible.
Davidson disagreed. He thought that we could make no sense of meanings that cannot be expressed in our language. How are we to assess this disagreement between Quine and Davidson?
Recall our earlier definition of transcendent meaning t .
X in L means t E iff the translation of X into our language means i E.
Consider the further claim:
X in L means t something iff there is a translation of X in L into our language.
This further claim does not follow from the definition of transcendent meaning t , because it is possible that X in L means something but there is no way of stating what X means in our language, no true statement in our language of the form "X in L means t E."
But Davidson argued that, since our understanding of transcendent meaning t arises from considerations of translation into our language, it does not make sense to suppose that something could have a transcendent meaning t that we cannot express in our language (and therefore it does not make sense to suppose there could be be an "alternative conceptual scheme" to our own).
One issue is whether our language is "universal" in the sense that anything can be expressed in it. Tarski thought so and thought that this led to paradox). 11 Jerry Katz also thought that every natural language was universal (but believed this did not lead to paradox). 12 It might be objected that we have many concepts today that people did not have two hundred years ago, for example, various scientific concepts of electrons, quarks, and quantum states. It seems that the language of two hundred years ago could not express these concepts, which our language can express, so the language of two hundred years ago was not universal. If so, how can we suppose that our language today is universal?
Katz replied that today's concepts could have been explained to people of two hundred years ago, given enough time, and our current language Davidson may or may not have agreed with Katz, but he certainly disagreed with Quine's idea that questions of significance were distinct from questions of translation. Quine argued that we can tell people are using a language from the way they interact with each other, quite apart from whether we can translate them. Davidson replied that not all social interactions involve language use and that to be justified in attributing language to people we have to be justified in attributing to them something translat-able into our language, whether or not we can at the moment provide that translation.
This is a difficult interesting issue that is not easy to resolve.
Conclusion
In 
